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Internet message boards are often used to spread information in order to manipulate 
financial markets.  Although this hypothesis is supported by many cases reported in the 
literature and in the media, the real impact of manipulation in online forums on financial 
markets remains an open question. This paper is on the effect of manipulation in internet 
stock message boards on financial markets by employing a unique corpus of moderated 
messages to investigate market manipulation. Internet message board administrators use 
the process of moderation to restrict market manipulation. We find that manual supervision 
of stock message boards by moderators does not effectively protect Internet users against 
manipulation. By focusing on messages that have been moderated as manipulative due to 
ramping, we show ramping is positively related to market returns, volatility and volume. 
Stocks with higher turnover, lower price level, lower market capitalization and higher 
volatility are more common targets of ramping. 
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Internet stock message boards provide an effective medium for investors to communicate, 
to disseminate and discover new information. However, the value and integrity of internet 
stock message boards are often criticized and investors are warned not to trade on the 
information provided (Fraser, 2007). In order to address these issues, regulators often 
dictate that message board providers conform to specific guidelines.
1
  Nevertheless, people 
continue to use Internet forums for their own purposes, and financial surveillance analysts 
                                                          
1 For example, in Australia, see Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) Regulatory 
Guide 162, http://www.asic.gov.au. 
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 is the most popular internet stock message board in Australia and forms 
the focus of our study. This site operates under a strict code of conduct which prohibits 
unethical or illegal use of the forum. Administrators moderate postings which do not 
conform to the guidelines, and can revoke access for users who consistently disregard the 
rules. Moderated posts are labeled with the reason for moderation, for example ramping, 
flaming or profanity. These posts serve to proxy manipulative behaviour. Using an event 
study methodology, we investigate whether ramping is related to stock price volatility, 
trade volume and returns.  Further, we study the firm characteristics targeted by rampers. 
First we find that manual moderation of messages cannot effectively prevent ramping 
to take place in internet stock messages. This result is supported by the high number of 
posts that are moderated due to ramping every day, which indicates that ramping is a 
common phenomenon. In addition, we find that the lead time to moderation is 
approximately 8 hours, allowing sufficient time for these posts to impact the market.  Our 
results also demonstrate that ramping is positively related to market returns, volatility and 
volume. Firms with higher turnover, lower price level, lower market capitalization and 
higher volatility also receive a higher proportion of ramping posts suggesting that they are 
more common targets of ramping. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present an 
overview of previous works. This serves as motivation for the development of our 
hypotheses in section 3. In section 4, we describe the data and empirical methodology used 
in our analysis. The results are reported and discussed in section 5, and section 6 concludes 
by providing some areas for further work. 
 
2. Literature review 
Stock market manipulation is generally defined as the creation and exploitation of arbitrage 
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opportunities (Zigrand, 2006). Manipulation of stock prices may occur through direct 
trading strategies or indirectly via the dissemination of distorted price sensitive 
information. The former may be observed when trades are intentionally placed in the 
wrong direction or short term losses are being undertaken to move prices in the desired 
direction (Chakraborty and Ylmaz, 2004). The latter may occur through mediums such as 
investment blogs, spam emails and online stock message forums (Antweiler and Frank, 
2004; Das and Sisk, 2005; Aggarwal and Wu, 2006). However, the detection of both types 
of manipulative behaviour remains difficult due to the lack of proxy for the occurrence of 
manipulation. 
The impact of trade strategy manipulation can be observed in the market response to 
such strategies. For example, Aggarwal and Wu (2006) demonstrate that stock market 
manipulation cases pursued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
during 1990 through October 2001 were associated with greater stock volatility, greater 
liquidity and higher returns.  Other evidence of stock market reaction to manipulation is 
documented by Hillion and Suominen (2004), who highlight a general rise in volatility, 
trading volume and one-minute returns in the closing price of stocks in Paris Bourse during 
January and April, 1995. Further, the proportion of partially hidden orders increased during 
this period. 
Evidence of manipulation has also been found in certain types of derivatives markets 
such as the futures market.  It is shown that uninformed investors earn positive profits by 
creating a futures position and simultaneously trading in the spot market. As a result, 
arbitrage free profit opportunities are exploited to derive profitable cash settlement at the 
time of delivery (Kumar and Seppi, 1992; Merrick et al., 2005). 
Additional evidence of trade strategy manipulation include those found by Guo et al. 
(2008), who uses low earnings quality firms to proxy for firms‟ intention to manipulate. 
They find that these firms tend to use stock splits to manipulate equity values before 
acquisition announcements. On the other hand, Eom et al. (2009) find that investors 
strategically place spoofing intraday orders in the Korean Exchange. Spoofing orders have 
little chance of being executed, and are used to mislead other traders of an order book 
imbalance and thereby influence the direction of stock price movement. They conclude 
that stocks targeted for manipulation had higher return volatility, lower market 
capitalization, lower price level, and lower managerial transparency. Finally, large traders 
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have also been found to carry out manipulation due to its scale of operation and its ability 
to better sequence and time trades (Gastineau and Jarrow, 1991; Allen et al., 2006). 
Manipulative behaviour involving the intentional misinterpretation and dissemination 
of price sensitive information is more difficult to document. Bagnoli and Lipman (1988) 
address the problem of market manipulation through the announcement of a takeover bid. 
They develop a model where the manipulator takes a position, announces a takeover bid, 
and then unwinds his position. In their attempt to elucidate market manipulation from the 
1600s to the internet technology frauds of today, Leinweber and Madhavan (2001) show 
that, through technology, information can be quickly disseminated to influence investor 
perception on particular stocks. Stock spam emails and posting on internet message boards 
are two major avenues manipulators employ to affect investor sentiment because of their 
global reach and high degree of accessibility to investors. In particular, significant 
reactions of trading volume and returns have been shown to respond to spam campaigns 
(Bohme and Holz, 2006). Hanke and Hauser (2008) then extends the works of Leinweber 
and Madhavan (2001) and Bohme and Holz (2006) to provide corroborating evidence that 
stock spam e-mails significantly and positively impact volatility and intraday spread. 
Similar evidence is noted by Hu et al. (2009), who found that pump and dump email 
campaigns show a statistically significant decline in stock price from the peak spam day to 
the following day. 
Evidence of online impact of message board posting on stock activity is well 
documented in prior literature (Antweiler and Frank (2004); Das and Sisk (2005); 
Aggarwal and Wu (2006); Cook and Lu (2009)). Antweiler and Frank (2004) use 
computational linguistics methods to analyze the effect of message sentiment (buy, sell or 
hold) in forums to determine whether the information content of posts influence the stock 
market. They find that stock messages help predict volatility and disagreement between 
messages to be associated with increased trading volume. However, they find no 
correlation of message sentiments with the direction of returns. By improving sample 
selection and removing noise caused by program generated sentiments, Cook and Lu 
(2009) find that the bullishness of board messages positively and significantly predict 
abnormal stock return up to 2 days ahead.  When taking poster‟s credibility into account, 
they also find that the board messages‟ predictive power over stock returns becomes much 
stronger in terms of both economic magnitude and significance.  
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These studies demonstrate stock markets are likely to be sensitive to Internet message 
board activities. Moreover, many anecdotal evidences of market manipulation in Internet 
stock message boards have been reported in the financial literature and in the media 
(Leinweber and Madhavan, 2001; Harris, 2002). However, the phenomenon has not been 
investigated through a rigorous approach. To the best of our knowledge, this work provides 
the first quantitative analysis of market manipulation in Internet stock message boards. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
This research employs moderated postings unique to the Australian HotCopper online 
message forum. Improving upon prior literature such as Das and Sisk (2005), Chemmanur 
and Yan (2009) and Brown and Cliff (2004), HotCopper moderated postings allow us to 
proxy for manipulative behaviour directly. This is a unique opportunity available to us. 
Stock ramping through forums occurs when a ramper recommends a stock and 
highlights its huge potential to rise in share price in the very near future. The ramper buys a 
large quantity of a stock, and posts information to influence the masses into buying the 
stock with the aim to drive up the share price. By implying that readers of these posts are 
in possession of privileged information - such as insider knowledge of an impending 
takeover offer - rampers seek to persuade the gullible into purchasing a particular stock. If 
a significant enough number of easily-led individuals invest in the touted stock, a ramper 
can “ramp up” the share price so that he or she could sell their shares at a quick profit. 
Ramping can be both up or down. 
Stock message board administrators use the moderation process to restrict the 
manipulations of stock prices through ramping posts as a service to Internet users.  
However, the wide accessibility of internet technology and the high speed at which 
investors absorb news may diminish the effect of moderation. Therefore we want to test 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Manual moderation of stock message boards, as a monitoring strategy, does 
not protect users against manipulation. 
The direct measure of ramping through HotCopper moderated posts allow us to 
investigate the impact of ramping on stock market activity. It has been shown in the 
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literature that well advertised stocks are related to higher stock returns (Das and Sisk, 
2005; Chemmanur and Yan, 2009; Brown and Cliff, 2004). Based on the investor attention 
hypothesis proposed in Chemmanur and Yan (2009), which implies that high levels of 
stock advertising is associated with larger stock returns, stocks heavily promoted to 
investors via ramping postings may also generate higher returns.  One possible explanation 
proposed by Barber and Odean (2008) may be investors‟ need to select stocks out of the 
many available the ones that attract their attention will be the ones most likely to be 
included in their investment portfolio. 
Furthermore, extreme news announcements have been shown to produce high trade 
volume (Tetlock, 2007). Similarly, ramping posts, as a type of extreme news 
announcements, may potentially have the same effect. Both stock spam e-mails and 
messages in online message forums rely on the internet technology to increase its reach to 
investors (Leinweber and Madhavan, 2001). Drawing upon prior works (Bohme and Holz, 
2006; Hanke and Hauser, 2008; Hu et al., 2009) on the impact of stock spam e-mails on 
trade volatility and intraday spread, we hypothesize that manipulators may employ online 
message forum ramping to influence investor sentiments in a similar fashion. If ramping 
posts does indeed have an impact on investor sentiment prior to moderation, we may form 
the following hypothesis to test the relation between moderated ramping posts and stock 
market response: 
Hypothesis 2: Ramping in internet stock message boards affects stock price volatility, 
volume and returns. 
Finally, we attempt to describe the characteristics of rampers‟ target firm stocks. Since 
manipulation is more effective when there is greater uncertainty about the value of a firm, 
we expect that stocks with a higher return volatility would attract more ramping attempts 
(Eom et al., 2009). Firm size has also been shown to be significantly positively associated 
with the level of disclosure (Alsaeed, 2006). This can be explained by the fact that larger 
publicly listed firms receive higher analyst coverage. On the other hand, smaller firms 
receive less coverage and thus are more susceptible to price movements driven by private 
information release. To that end, we expect smaller firms to be more prone to manipulation 
through ramping. Hanke and Hauser (2008) report that liquidity is a significant 
characteristic of companies targeted by spammers. The lower the liquidity, the larger the 
price impact. In addition, the impact of spamming on trade volume is markedly higher for 
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low-turnover stocks. The reaction of high-turnover stocks to spamming is generally lower 
because it takes a greater number of participants to move prices. To similar effect, we 
expect rampers to target low-turnover stocks (low liquidity). Therefore, in order to 
investigate the characteristics of firms targeted by rampers, we form the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Stocks targeted for manipulation have higher return volatility, lower market 
capitalization, lower price level, and lower turnover. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1. Data 
The data for this study comes from HotCopper, Australia‟s largest internet stock message 
board. The time period runs from January 2008 to December 2008 inclusive. Messages 
were downloaded from the HotCopper website using software written by the authors, and 
we restricted our collection of data to only include messages that have a ticker symbol field 
representing an ASX listed company. Each message contains the following fields: date, 
time, author, ticker symbol and content. In total, the data set contains 1,146,223 messages 
for 1,825 firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). 
An interesting feature of the HotCopper forum is that the moderated posts are labeled 
with the main reason of their moderation.  In accordance with Australian law regarding all 
information available in the securities market, HotCopper users are expected to comply 
with a set of strict usage guidelines.
3
 Messages that do not comply may be moderated by a 
volunteer or by an administrator.
4
 Such messages are not removed from the forum, but 
their content is replaced by a message, which contains the following information: 
moderation time, moderation type, and a comment specifying the reasons for moderation. 
The full set of moderation types with their respective percentage composition are listed in 
Table 1. Each type is a simple phrase that describes the primary reason for moderation.  
Some examples of textual comments are provided below: 
                                                          
3
 User Posting Guidelines, http://www.HotCopper.com.au/postingguidelines/. 
4
 List of moderators, http://www.HotCopper.com.au/forum_modList.asp. 
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 All you seem to be doing is plaguing threads with your down-ramping on non-held 
stocks. Find something else to do with your time instead of wasting others. Snide remarks 
on stocks are not considered helpful or useful posts. 
 Rumors aren‟t required thanks. They usually lead to misinformation on a public forum. 
No more like this, thanks. 
 This post is being moderated because of the unsubstantiated information particularly 
“Every deal done falls through”. This just isn‟t true. Please refrain from flaming other 
posters too. 
In addition to the HotCopper data, we obtained the daily closing prices, high and low 
intraday prices and volume data for all companies listed on the ASX in 2008 from Reuters. 
We excluded all firms that had fewer than 50 posts during 2008 from our data set.  Our 
final sample size consists of 1,083,913 posts for 938 firms. Note that results presented in 
Table 1 are based on the final sample size.  
Table 1: Moderation types found on HotCopper in 2008 
 







Flaming 3,583 25.3% 
Ramping 1,519 10.7% 
Profanity 1,207 8.5% 
Spamming 389 2.8% 
Defamatory 351 2.5% 
Unknown Reason 159 1.1% 
Advertising 152 1.1% 
Unlicensed Advice 72 0.5% 
Duplicate 73 0.5% 
Insider Trading 73 0.5% 
Copyright 63 0.4% 
Sexist 43 0.3% 
Racist 43 0.3% 
Blasphemous 33 0.2% 





We apply an event study methodology to analyze the market impact of ramping in 
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internet stock message boards.  We define a trade event for a certain stock as a day on 
which the market is open for trading in that stock. We further define a posting event for a 
certain stock as a day on which at least one message has been posted in the message board 
discussing this stock. Similarly, we define a moderation event for a certain stock as a day 
on which at least one message discussing this stock has been moderated. Finally, we define 
a ramping event for a certain stock as a day on which at least one message has been 
moderated because of an attempt to ramp this stock. 
The performance of a stock is measured in terms of the dependent variables defined by 
Hanke and Hauser (2008) and also used by Hu et al. (2009), that is, stock return, volatility, 
intraday volatility and turnover. Their definitions of these variables are shown in Figure 1. 
          Figure 1: Dependent variables defined by Hanke and Hauser (2008) 
  
As discussed in Section 4.1, HotCopper posts may be moderated due to several 
reasons, but each moderated post can only be labeled with one of the moderation types 
given in Table 1.  This restriction and the close similarity between some of the moderation 
types may result in the ramping posts being labeled differently. For example, a post which 
could be labeled as both „Unlicensed Advice‟ and „Ramping‟ may only be labeled as 
„Unlicensed Advice‟. Posts that are moderated due to multiple reasons are often labeled as 
„Other‟, which explains the high percentage of moderation under „Other‟ (45.1%) as given 
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in Table 1. 
We found a significant number of ambiguous moderated posts in which the 
moderators assign one label but mention several causes for moderation in the comment 
field. Since our focus is on investigating the impact of ramping, it is important that we 
incorporate all posts that could potentially be seen as ramping. As a result, we include 
posts that mention the keyword „ramp‟ or „unlicensed advice‟ in the moderator‟s comment 
as an additional explanatory variable in our regression analysis. 
Figure 2: Regression Model for the Impact Study 
 
The regression equation for this impact study is given in Figure 2. The market and 
volume are used as added control variables. We also included in our model a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if a company announcement for stock i was released on day t 
and 0 otherwise. We include this in our model in order to control for the impact of 
company announcements on the performance of stocks. 
As outlined in section 3, particular types of firms are more likely to be targeted for 
manipulation than others. We use the regression model shown in Figure 3 in order to 
investigate the characteristics of the firms targeted by rampers. In this regression, the 
dependent variable is the probability for a post to be moderated because of ramping, which 
we take as a proxy for the probability for the stock of being ramped. 
 








5. Results and Discussion 
 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Moderation activity: We define moderation delay as the difference between publication 
time and moderation time for a particular post on an internet message board. In 2008, for 
the 938 stocks included in the sample, the mean moderation delay was 7.95 hours (σ = 
15.93). In addition, 40.78 per cent of moderated posts were moderated after two hours. 
This is sufficient time for ramping on forums to be effective, which supports Hypothesis 1. 
We found that in general, inappropriate posts tend to be published outside of normal 
trading hours. This is demonstrated by the graph shown in Figure 4, which represents the 
proportion of moderated posts and with respect to the hour of day. What is most interesting 
here is the daily pattern of posts, which are moderated because of ramping. The graph 
identifies quite clearly that ramping is more active during trading hours, which is quite 
different to the general pattern for moderated posts. We believe that the reason for this is 
that ramping messages created outside of normal trading hours are less likely to be 
effective since they are more likely to be moderated before market opening. 
This figure plots the proportions of moderated posts and ramping posts divided by the 
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proportion of posts with respect to the hour of the day. 
Figure 4:  Ramping versus Moderation Activities 
 
Dependent variables: Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. In 2008, 
for the 938 stocks included in the sample, we have 238,252 trade events, 100,695 posting 
events, 4,870 moderation events and 768 ramping events. The number of ramping events 
reported is only a lower bound to the actual number of ramping events. With the 
increasingly high volume of messages that are posted on internet stock forums, it is likely 
that some of the inappropriate posts will not be discovered in the manual moderation 
process. However, these posts are not taken into account in our analysis. For example, the 
following unmoderated posts could be considered as ramping: 
 I heard a rumor that the plant is still being repaired and may be operating again later 
today. 
 I am focusing on oil stocks now, not affected by all this, and also I heard a rumor even 
General Motors now admit our oil has run out on what we can produce in one day and now 
in decline, which is good news to the oil stocks. 
Table 2 shows that ramping events have the highest mean for returns, volatility, intra-
day volatility and volume which supports Hypothesis 2. Ramping events have the lowest 
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mean price of the four types of events.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
It indicates that the “pump and dump” interest is the highest for small-priced firms. 
Interestingly, the mean returns for panel A, B and C are negative. A possible explanation 
could be the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis that hit the market in the last quarter 
of 2008. However, the mean return for ramping events is positive, which shows that 
ramping co-occurs with price increase. 
In sub-section 5.3 we further investigate the impact of ramping on the four dependent 
variables taking into account the firm characteristics. This table presents the mean, median 
and standard deviation for the dependent variables namely, Return (RET), Volatility (SIG), 
Intraday volatility (SPR) and Turnover (VOL). Panel A presents the statistics for all the 
firms across all the days for January 2008 through December 2008. Panels B, C and D 
present the same statistics only for days with at least one post, days with at least one 
moderated post and days with at least one ramping post respectively. 
Impact of manipulation in IMS: Table 3 shows the results of the regression analysis for 
the model given in Figure 2. The results show that the independent variables Volume, 
Market, the release of company Announcements and Ramping are significantly correlated 
to return, volatility, intra-day volatility and volume. The correlation coefficients are 
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positive for the four variables, but the confidence is stronger for volatility, intra-day 
volatility and volume. Insider Trading is also is also significantly correlated to volume, 
intra-day volatility and return. 
 Table 3: Impact Study Results 
 
We previously introduced the dummy variable „Ramping in comment‟ which 
corresponds to moderated events where at least one moderation comment contain the word 
“ramp” or “unlicensed advice”. The variable is also correlated to the two volatility 
measures, and volume to a lower extent. For volume we find a positive correlation with 
Ramping, Insider Trading, Other, Advertising, Flaming and Profanity. Other is a general 
category that is used for posts moderated because of miscellaneous or mixed reasons (and 
so can include Ramping, Flaming and Profanity). 
Our results are limited by the fact that we only have closing prices and do not 
currently have access to intra-day prices. This results in an inability to distinguish between 
different moderated posts, that is, we cannot identify the impact of a specific ramping post 
on the market. Indeed, a ramping posting cannot be measured independently of other 
moderated posts (such as profanity), which occur on the same day. Hence, we cannot 
accurately identify whether a specific ramping post has been effective in its cause. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Target Firms 
 
 
Determinants of target firms: In this section, we present our findings in investigating 
the characteristics of firms, which are the most common targets for ramping in forums. 
Since some of the independent variables are significantly correlated, we implement both 
simple and multiple regressions in order to minimize the multicollinearity problem. In the 
simple regressions (regressions (1) through (4)), stocks with higher turnover, lower price 
level and higher volatility tend to receive a higher proportion of ramping posts. Market 
capitalization is also negatively correlated to the proportion of ramping posts but with a 
low significant value. Regression (5), which controls for multicollinearity, confirms that 
firms with higher turnover, lower price level, lower market capitalization and higher 
volatility receive a higher proportion of ramping posts. However, the correlation is highly 
significant only for volume. 
 
6. Conclusions and Directions for Future Work 
To the best of our knowledge, this work provides the first quantitative analysis of market 
manipulation of Internet stock message boards. Employing a unique body of moderated 
messages, we are able to identify messages that have been moderated as manipulative due 
to ramping and examined its relationship with market response. We find that manual 
moderation of internet stock message boards does not effectively protect users against 
manipulation.  This is consistent with our expectation that rampers in forums are difficult 
to identify even for moderators.  The possible reasons could be due to the fact that ramping 
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can be a long progressive process, by which a ramper inconspicuously disseminates his 
ideas but attempts to hide the motivation to ramp. Our experiment also shows that ramping 
is positively and significantly related to market returns, volatility and volume. In addition, 
our results demonstrate that stocks with higher turnover, lower price level, lower market 
capitalization and higher volatility are more common targets of ramping. 
Our proxy for ramping is not perfect. Future works may include the development of 
techniques to detect well-concealed smart manipulators amongst posts not yet reviewed by 
moderators. Computational linguistics techniques could be employed to detect ramping 
and to refine our proxy for ramping. As discussed in section 5, the number of posts 
moderated due to ramping is only a lower bound to the actual number of ramping posts.  
To identify ramping posts that have not been labeled by moderators, we need to examine 
the content of all unmoderated posts. We plan to build a text classifier to automatically 
identify posts with inappropriate content.  Applying this classifier to unmoderated posts 
will enable us to discover posts that should have been moderated due to ramping and 
subsequently to refine our proxy for ramping.  The following two sample unmoderated 
posts shows that an improvement can be made to detect the poster‟s intention to ramp. 
 “I heard a rumor that the plant is still being repaired and may be operating again later 
today. Does anyone know how to contact the fellow from Atmos that is mentioned in this 
article?” 
 “I‟m focusing on oil stocks now, not affected by all this, and also I heard a rumor even 
General Motors now admit our oil has run out on what we can produce in one day and now 
in decline, which is good news to the oil stocks.” 
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